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Abstract
This paper uses the License of Right (LOR) provision implemented in Section 23 of the German
Patent Act to answer the following questions: What is the distribution of the private value of
the right to exclude others provided by a patent? What are the welfare implications of having
a License of Right system? Section 23 of the German Patent Act grants a patentee a 50%
reduction on the annual renewal fees if he voluntarily allows anyone to use the invention only
in return for reasonable compensation. We build a parametric discrete choice model of patent
renewal and LOR declaration to exploit data on granted German patent applications from 1983-
1988. Our estimates show that the distribution of the value of the right to exclude others is very
skewed and its relative importance rises with patent age. For most patent owners the exclusion
right is very valuable. Nevertheless, for a small fraction of patents a commitment to license
non-exclusively may even increase the returns from patent protection. The welfare implications
of the License of Right system in Germany are twofold. It increases the private value of patent
rights but lowers the patent office's revenues. Furthermore, we are able to distinguish between
two motives for declaring LOR, the cost-saving and the commitment motive. The fraction
of declarations made out of the cost-saving motive is relatively low for young patents but
increasing with patent age. In a counterfactual experiment we simulate the impact of making
LOR declarations compulsory. We show that a compulsory licensing system could deprive the
patent owners of a very substantial part of the incentives currently provided by the patent
system.
Keywords: value of exclusivity, patent valuation, license of right, compulsory licensing, patent
renewal model
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1 Introduction
By definition a patent is an exclusion right over an invention granted by society for a limited
period of time. In exchange, the patent applicant is obliged to disclose all technical infor-
mation on the claimed invention to society. If the patent protects exactly one product and
knowledge is not cumulative, the following economic trade-off ensues: On the one hand, the
protection against competition from others should increase the incentives of the inventor to
invest in innovative activities and the obligation to disclose his invention should promote the
dissemination of knowledge (dynamic efficiency). On the other hand, the right to exclude
others may create temporary monopoly power and impose a welfare loss on society (static
inefficiency).
However, recent theoretical as well as empirical economic literature has recognized that at
least two of the assumptions on which the traditional economic trade-off described above is
based on may often fail in reality. Most of the innovation activities are inherently cumula-
tive (Scotchmer 1991) and products are often covered by multiple patent rights (Heller and
Eisenberg 1998). In this case two additional opposed welfare effects arise.1 On the one hand,
patents may even increase competition by helping to establish a market for knowledge. They
can be traded as an input good as well as facilitating entry of new competitors hence improv-
ing static efficiency. On the other hand, in the new setting the exclusivity right gets a new
leverage. If an inventor is excluded from the use of patents his invention builds on, or if the
access to all complementary patents needed for commercialization is denied, he will not be
able to appropriate any returns. To reduce the fragmentation threat firms may even increase
their defensive patenting activities (Ziedonis 2004) creating an even denser net of patent
rights. This behavior can considerably hamper dynamic efficiency. Already existing knowl-
edge will remain underused and inventors can be discouraged to invest in the combination of
new ideas and inventions. Thus, the question arises how to reduce the economic distortions
created by the exclusive right conferred by a patent while maintaining the positive incentive
effects to inventors.
One possible approach to tackle the problem is to increase access to patented inventions by
reducing the exclusivity rights of patentees. Alongside private solutionssuch as standards,
clearing houses, and patent pools where patent owners transfer their rights into a bundle
which can be licensed by othersseveral institutional initiatives have been discussed.2 Two
prominent examples are Compulsory Licensing (CL) and Licenses of Right (LOR). Both
systems are based on the idea of transforming the patent right from an absolute permission
rule with a right to exclude others (Merges 1996) into a liability rule, where the patent
1See Hall and Harhoff (2012) for an extensive discussion.
2See Schovsbo (2009) for an overview.
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owner has only a right to reasonable remuneration, i.e., licensing revenues. The CL system
requires the patent owner by law to make licenses available to any party requesting a license.
Although it clearly reduces the degree of exclusivity CL may considerably reduce the profits
from patent protection and diminish the incentives to engage in innovative activities. In
contrast, LOR is a system where the patent may, at the request of its owner, be transformed
into a liability rule. However, it is rather unlikely that patentees would voluntarily give up
their right to exclude others, unless the legislator provides appropriate incentives. To be able
to analyze both systems economically and derive possible welfare statements it is necessary
to know the distribution of the returns from patent protection. But even more important is
to know which part of the value can be attributed to the right to exclude others and which
part can be sustained with only a right to reasonable remuneration.
Hence, the aim of this paper will be twofold. First, we will present a framework for estimating
the distribution of the value of exclusivity using German patent data. Second, we will use
the estimation results to evaluate the welfare effects of the LOR system as implemented in
Germany. We will further calculate the patent owners' losses in private value associated with
the introduction of a CL system.
The License of Right or Willingness to License was introduced on October 01, 1936 into
the German patent system. It is stated in Sec. 23 of the German Patent Act that [i]f the
applicant for a patent or the person recorded as patentee [...] declares to the Patent Office
in writing that he is prepared to allow anyone to use the invention in return for reasonable
compensation, the annual [maintenance] fees falling due after receipt of the declaration shall
be reduced to one half [...].3
In Germany, License of Right is declared for almost 6% of all granted patent applications.
However, the usage rates differ highly across technology areas as well as across applicant
types. In the area of electrical engineering LOR is declared for over 11% of all patents
whereas in the area of chemistry and biotechnology the usage rate is 1.3%. More than
12% of patents filed by large corporations and only less than 2% of patents filed by small
corporations are endorsed LOR when they expire.
Assuming rational behavior, the patent applicant will only declare LOR if his expected
returns from patent protection without the right to exclude net of the reduced renewal fees
will exceed the expected returns from full patent protection net of the regular renewal fees.
The difference between the returns from full patent protection and the returns from patent
protection without the right to exclude others is what we define as the value of exclusivity.
We will use the decision to declare LOR taken by the patent owner to identify the distribution
3If the parties are unable to agree on a compensation scheme it can be assessed by the Patent Division at
the written request of one of the parties. This makes the provision enforceable for the patent owner as well
as the potential licensee.
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of the value of exclusivity for German patents.
To perform the estimations we will develop a model of patent renewal and LOR declara-
tion. This model extends the traditional patent renewal models first developed in Pakes and
Schankerman (1984), Pakes (1986), and Schankerman and Pakes (1986). The traditional
patent renewal models are discrete choice models which incorporate a patentee's optimal de-
cision when to let his patent expire in order to estimate the distribution of the private value
of patent protection. Given that for each additional year of patent protection the patentee
has to pay renewal fees, he will only maintain patent protection as long as these yearly fees
do not exceed his expected returns from having a patent. We extend this framework and
allow for a third option, the declaration of LOR. Similar to the German provision, if the
patentee chooses the third option, the maintenance fees will be reduced, and he will lose the
right to exclude others. Thus, the decision to declare or not to declare LOR ought to con-
tain information about the private value of exclusivity. The model is subsequently estimated
using a simulated general method of moments estimator (SGMM).
Subsequently, we employ the estimated parameters to evaluate the effects of two hypothetical
policy changes. First, we consider the abolishment of the LOR option from the German
patent system. From this experiment we learn about the effects of LOR on the private value
of patent protection and on the German patent office's revenues. Patent maintenance fees
are usually one of the main sources of patent office finance. In our second experiment we
introduce a compulsory licensing requirement for all patents from the application day on.
This allows us to estimate the costs imposed on the patent holders by a CL system.
The outline of the paper is as follows. In the next section we develop the patent renewal
model incorporating the decision to declare LOR. Section 3 presents the estimation strategy
and the stochastic specification. The data are described in Section 4. In Section 5 and
Section 6 we discuss the estimation results and its implications. Section 7 concludes.
2 The Model
Patent system An agent can acquire a patent with full protection, which allows him to
exclude others from the patented invention. Keeping patent protectionwe will call it strategy
(K)is not free of charge and the agent must pay renewal fees ct = ft at the beginning of each
period t ∈ 1, ..., T . T is the maximum number of years a patent is allowed to be renewed. If
he decides not to pay the fees the patent will expire (X) forever. As is common in most patent
systems, the fees are rising with a patent's maturity ft ≤ ft+1. Alternatively, the patentee
can switch to the License of Right regime which we will call strategy (L). Contrary to the full
protection regime, it prohibits excluding others from the invention but maintains the right
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to reasonable remuneration through licensing. In turn, the patent owner is only required to
pay half of the statutory renewal fees ct =
1
2
ft. We further assume that once LOR has been
declared, the patentee can never return to full patent protection. He can either renew within
the LOR regime (L) or let the patent expire (X).
We also assume that each patent belongs to exactly one agent. Furthermore, all agents are
rational in the sense that in the beginning of each period they will choose the regime that
will maximize their expected profits given the available information.
Evolution of returns We assume that a patent generates returns zt in each year t which
depend on the type of patent protection. Returns are 0 if the patent expires, zt = 0. The
per period returns in case of full patent protection, zt = rt, differ from those of a patent
endorsed LOR by a multiplicative factor glt such that zt = yt = g
l
trt. The factor g
l
t represents
the fraction of the returns which can be realized by a patent without the right to exclude
others. This means in turn that (1−glt)rt corresponds to the returns that can be derived from
exclusivity. We allow glt to exceed 1. It might well be that the commitment to non-exclusive
licensing may even increase the patentee's revenues.4
The yearly returns are not constant and evolve over time in the following way:
• In the beginning of a patent's life an initial return from full patent protection, r1, is
assigned to each patent. Let r1 be drawn i.i.d. from a continuous distribution FIR on
a positive domain.
• The returns from full patent protection in the following years rt, t ∈ 2, ..., T , change
over a patent's life cycle. We assume that they evolve from the previous period such
that rt = g
k
t rt−1, where g
k
t ∈
[
0, Bk
]
is the growth rate of returns in case of full
patent protection.5 A growth rate gkt < 1 represents a depreciation, whereas g
k
t > 1
represents an increase of the revenues from full patent protection. The growth rates
are drawn i.i.d. from continuous distributions with the cumulative density functions
Fgk(u
k|t) = Pr [gkt ≤ uk], t ∈ 2, ..., T . We assume that the probability to have a
high growth rate gkt and to discover a way to increase the returns compared to the
previous year decreases with the patent's maturity in the sense of first-order stochastic
dominance (Fgk(u
k | t) ≤ Fgk(uk | t+ 1)).6
• The shares of returns which can be realized in a LOR regime glt ∈
[
0, Bl
]
, t ∈ 1, ..., T ,
are drawn i.i.d. from yet other distributions with the cumulative density functions
4See Rudyk (2012) for a discussion.
5This stochastic specification fulfills the Markov property. This means that the returns in the future
periods are independent of past periods' returns.
6Usually, the application and usage of an invention is determined early in a patent's life. The probability
to discover new uses in later periods should hence decrease over time.
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Fgl(u
l|t) = Pr [glt ≤ ul], t ∈ 1, ..., T . Furthermore, we assume that the probability to
have a high LOR growth rate is also decreasing with the patent's age throughout all
periods in the sense of first-order stochastic dominance Fgl(u
l | t) ≤ Fgl(ul | t+ 1).7
• We assume that the patentee has perfect information about the distributions of all
future growth rates in all regimes but that the per period returns zt, i.e, the growth
rates gkt and g
l
t, are revealed to him only in the beginning of each period t.
Maximization problem The agent has to choose the strategy with the highest expected
value in the beginning of each period, since this is when the renewal fees are due. His value
functions in each regime will consist of returns and costs from the current period as well as
the option value of his choices in future periods. We define V˜K(t, rt, yt) as the value function
of the patentee's optimal strategy in year t if the patent has been renewed with full patent
protection (K) in all previous periods. In this case the patent owner can choose between all
three strategies, (K), (L), and (X). Similarly, V˜L(t, yt) is the value function of the patentee's
optimal strategy in year t if LOR, i.e., strategy (L), has been declared in one of the previous
periods and strategy (K) in all periods preceding the declaration. In this case he can only
choose between strategy (L) and (X) for the following year.
Consider now a patent in the beginning of year t, t < T , which has been renewed with full
patent protection in all previous periods. The patentee has three choices. He can either keep
full patent protection (K), declare LOR (L), or let his patent expire (X). If he decides not
to pay the renewal fees in this period and lets his patent expire (X) his returns from this
strategy, V˜ X(t), will be 0:8
V˜ X(t) = 0
If the agent decides instead to renew the patent with full patent protection (K) his value
function will consist of the returns in the current period rt, net of the renewal fees ft, plus
the discounted option value of having the full strategy choicestrategies (X), (K), and (L)in
the subsequent period. The option value will be a function of the current returns rt. With
β as the discount factor between the periods we get the following value function for strategy
(K):
V˜ K(t, rt) = rt − ft + βE
[
V˜K(t+ 1, rt+1, yt+1) | rt
]
(1)
7This is just a simplifying assumption. Nevertheless, in the estimations below we will allow for the
possibility that the probability to have a higher LOR growth rate may increase with a patent's age. We will
test the assumption using German patent data.
8V˜ i(.), i = K,L,X denotes the value function in case the patentee would choose strategy i. It does not
mean that this is his optimal strategy in the corresponding year.
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with
E
[
V˜K(t+ 1, rt+1, yt+1) | rt
]
=
´ ´
V˜K(t+ 1, u
krt, u
lukrt)dFgk(u
k | t)dFgl(ul | t)
and
V˜K(t+ 1, rt+1, yt+1) = max
{
V˜ K(t+ 1, rt+1), V˜
L(t+ 1, yt+1), V˜
X(t+ 1)
}
If instead he decides to declare LOR (L), his current returns from patent protection will
equal yt = g
l
trt. The renewal fees for all following years will be reduced by half. He will also
lose the right to return to the full protection regime (K). The patentee will only be able to
renew his right to reasonable remuneration (L) or to let the patent expire (X). We assume
that once the declaration has been made the LOR growth rate glt, which is the share of profits
without the right to exclude, remains constant in the following periods. This means that if
LOR has been declared in year a and the patent is allowed to expire in year b, it must be
that glt = g
l
a for all periods t ∈ {a, a + 1, ..., b}. The LOR growth rate varies only as long as
LOR has not yet been declared. The justification for this assumption is that a declaration
may go along with the conclusion of licensing agreements. This means that the potential for
non-exclusive licensing will be determined at this stage for all future periods. The option
value, E
[
V˜L(t+ 1, yt+1) | rt, glt
]
, will now depend on the current returns rt from full patent
protection as well as the LOR growth rate glt from the period of declaration. Thus, the value
function for a patentee who chooses to declare LOR (L) is:
V˜ L(t, yt) = yt − 12ft + βE
[
V˜L(t+ 1, yt+1) | rt, glt
]
= gltrt − 12ft + βE
[
V˜L(t+ 1, g
l
trt+1) | rt
] (2)
with
E
[
V˜L(t+ 1, g
l
trt+1) | rt
]
=
´
V˜L(t+ 1, g
l
tu
krt)dFgk(u
k | t)
and
V˜L(t+ 1, yt+1) = max
{
V˜ L(t+ 1, yt+1), V˜
X(t+ 1)
}
Now that we have stated the value functions we will describe the solution to the maximization
problem. Since the maximum number of years a patent can be renewed is finite, T <∞, the
option value in the last period is always 0 independent of the protection regime. Thus, the
model can be solved by backward recursion determining an agent's optimal decision in each
period.
The agent's optimal decision in each year t is fully determined by the size of the per period
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returns rt and the LOR growth rate g
l
t (and thus yt). Dependent on whether these returns
will exceed certain threshold values or not, the patentee will either choose to keep full patent
protection (K), to declare LOR (L), or to let it expire (X):
• {rˆt}Tt=1 : patent returns that make the agent indifferent between keeping a patent
with full patent protection (K) in year t and letting it expire (X). It is defined by
V˜ K (t, rˆt) = 0.
9
• {gˆl−t (rt)}Tt=1 : growth rates that make the agent indifferent between declaring LOR (L)
and letting a patent expire (X) in year t. It depends on the level of returns rt from full
patent protection and is defined by V˜ L
(
t, gˆl−t rt
)
= 0.
• {gˆl+t (rt)}Tt=1: growth rates that make the agent indifferent between declaring LOR (L)
and keeping full patent protection (K). It depends on the level of per period returns rt
from full patent protection and is defined by V˜ K (t, rt) = V˜
L
(
t, gˆl+t rt
)
.
The following lemma guarantees that these threshold values exist and are unique.
Lemma 1. The value functions V˜ K(t, rt) and V˜
L(t, yt), with t = 1, ..., T , are
(i) increasing and (ii) continuous in the current returns rt and yt,
(iii) and non-increasing in t.
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
All three vectors of cut-off functions define the strategy space for a patent owner in each
year. Consider a patent that has been renewed with full protection up to period t. The
patentee can now choose between all three strategies: (K), (L), and (X). As one can see
in Figure 1 the cut-off functions rˆt, gˆ
l+
t (rt), and gˆ
l−
t (rt) divide the (rt, g
l
t)-space in exactly
three regions. Letting the patent expire (X) will be the optimal strategy if and only if the
current per period returns rt as well as the LOR growth rate g
l
t will both be lower than their
corresponding threshold values rˆt and gˆ
l−
t (rt) (the region in the lower left corner in Figure
1). In this case renewal in any regime, (L) or (X), would not justify the costs of renewal. If
in turn the current per period returns from full patent protection are high enough, rt ≥ rˆt,
renewal will be optimal in any case. The agent will renew with full patent protection (K)
as long as the LOR growth rate is not too high, glt < gˆ
l+
t (rt). These patents are located in
the lower right part of the figure. A declaration of the willingness to license (L) will be the
optimal strategy if the LOR growth rate is high enough, such that glt ≥ gˆl+t (rt). We call
9Remember that V˜ X(t) = 0 throughout all periods.
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Figure 1: Strategy Space of a Patent with Full Protection
this the commitment motive for LOR declaration. By committing to license non-exclusively
and simultaneously reducing all future renewal fees the patentee can improve his expected
profits. In this case he will declare LOR instead of keeping full patent protection. These
patents are located in the upper right part of the figure. Patentees can also declare LOR out
of the cost-saving motive. These are all patents which are situated in the upper left part of
the figure. If the current per period returns are too low, rt < rˆt, such that renewal with full
patent protection will never be optimal, the patentee may still declare LOR. As long as he
can sustain a sufficient part of the returns without the exclusion right, i.e., glt ≥ gˆl−t (rt), the
reduction in future renewal fees can turn the LOR declaration into a profitable strategy.
Consider now a patent that has been renewed up to period t and for which LOR was declared
in year a, a < t. The patentee has only two options, he can either renew the patent endorsed
LOR (L) or let it expire (X). In this case yˆt = g
l
art are the minimum revenues that a patent
endorsed LOR has to generate in this period for the patentee to keep patent protection.10
We can rewrite yˆt as a function in the (rt, g
l
t)-space. Thus, given per period returns rt, all
patents already endorsed LOR with growth rates gla ≤ gˆl−t (rt) will not be renewed (see Figure
2).
10yˆt is defined in V˜
L (t, yˆt) = 0.
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Figure 2: Strategy Space of a Patent Endorsed LOR
2.1 Comparative Statics
This section analyzes how the returns from patent protection rtwe call it selection effectand
the age of a patent twe call it horizon effectdetermine the agent's strategy space.
Selection effect The selection effect tells us how the probability to observe a declaration
of LOR varies with changes in returns from full patent protection rt.
Proposition 1. If it holds that11
1 + β
∂
{
E
[
V˜K(t+ 1, g
k
t+1rt, g
l
t+1g
k
t+1rt)
]
− E
[
V˜L(t+ 1, gˆ
l+
t (rt)g
k
t+1rt)
]}
∂r
> gˆl+t (rt)
then
(i) gˆl−t (rt) will be decreasing in rt and
(ii)gˆl+t (rt) will be increasing in rt.
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
11We have checked this assumption for the stochastic specifications which we use for the structural esti-
mations. Simulations have shown that this condition is always satisfied at reasonable parameter values.
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Assume that an agent has renewed his patent up to period t. There are two cases to be
considered. If rt < rˆt the patentee has to decide whether to declare LOR (L) or to let it
expire (X). He will only declare LOR if the current returns from a patent endorsed LOR,
yt = g
l
trt, and the option value, E
[
V˜L(t+ 1, gˆ
l+
t g
k
t+1rt)
]
, are high enough to cover the renewal
fees ft
2
. We know from Lemma 1 that the option value is non-decreasing in per period returns
rt. Thus, the higher rt, the lower can be the share of returns realized during the LOR regime,
glt, such that the agent is still willing to renew the patent. This is why the threshold value
functions gˆl−t (rt) decrease in rt in the respective region (see Figure 3). If the returns from
full patent protection are high enough, rt ≥ rˆt, the agent will choose between strategy (K)
and strategy (L). Now, the higher the per period returns rt, the less important will be the
reduction in renewal fees relative to the potential reduction in expected (future) returns due
to the loss of exclusivity. Therefore, a high growth rate glt is needed for the patentee to choose
LOR for valuable patents. This is represented by an increasing function gˆl+t (rt) in Figure 3.
To sum up, if the returns in case of full patent protection with the right to exclude others
are relatively low, the probability of observing a declaration Pr(glt ≥ gˆl−t (rt) | rt < rˆt) in year
t will be increasing with rt. If instead the patent is able to generate relatively high returns
in case of full patent protection, the probability of declaration Pr(glt ≥ gˆl+t (rt) | rt ≥ rˆt) will
be decreasing in rt.
Horizon effect In our model, by assumption not only the renewal fees but also the proba-
bility distributions vary with t. Consequently, the patent age should have an impact on both
the decision to declare LOR (L), the decision to keep full patent protection (K), or to let the
patent expire (X). This is reflected in the following propositions.
Proposition 2. The cut-off values rˆt are non-decreasing in t.
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
The threshold value rˆt is only relevant for patents that kept full protection in all previous
periods. It divides these patents into two categories. Those that would certainly have been
dropped (patents with rt < rˆt) and those that would certainly have been renewed with full
protection (patents with rt ≥ rˆt), if the LOR system had not existed. Given that the renewal
fees are increasing and the option value decreasing with t, the minimum returns, rˆt, needed
to belong to the second category, will also increase with t (see Figure 3).
10
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Figure 3: Selection and Horizon Effect
Proposition 3. Given rt,
(i) gˆl−t (rt) is non-decreasing in t and
(ii) the effect of t on gˆl+t (rt) is ambiguous.
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
Let us consider patents with relatively low returns from full patent protection (rt < rˆt). For
younger patents the renewal fees are lower and the option value higher than for older patents.
Thus, the minimum LOR growth rate needed for the agent to renew a younger patent should
be equal or even lower than the one needed for an older patent. This shifts the cut-off value
function gˆl−t (r) upwards for older patents (see Figure 3).
For patents with higher per period returns (rt ≥ rˆt) the horizon effect is ambiguous and
depends on the exact specification of the distributions of the growth rates. There are several
countervailing effects. On the one hand, gˆl+t (r) should decrease as patents get older, since the
maintenance fees are rising with a patent's maturity, and so is the cost difference between
both regimes. Furthermore, the older the patent, the smaller will be the loss in option value
(the patentee is giving up option (K)) in case of a declaration. On the other hand, Fgl(u
l | t)
11
is decreasing in t, reducing the chance for older patents to draw a high LOR growth rate glt.
Thus, gˆl+t (r) may nevertheless increase with t.
12
To sum up, patent age influences not only the probability of expiration but also the probability
to observe a LOR declaration. For patents with relatively low returns from full patent
protection, the probability of observing a declaration Pr(glt ≥ gˆl−t (rt) | rt < rˆt) will decrease
with t. If instead the returns are high, the probability Pr(glt ≥ gˆl+t (rt) | rt ≥ rˆt) may
either increase or decrease with t. The probability of expiration in year t is defined as
Pr(glt < gˆ
l−
t (rt) ∧ rt < rˆt) for patents not endorsed LOR and P (glt < gˆl−t (rt)) for patents
already endorsed LOR. We know from Proposition 2 and Proposition 3 that rˆt and gˆ
l−
t are
both increasing with age t. Therefore, these probabilities must increase with a patent's
maturity.
3 Estimation
3.1 Estimation Strategy
In the first step of the structural estimation we assign a stochastic specification to our struc-
tural model which will depend on a vector of parameters ω. In general, the stochastic
specification we assign to our model will determine the process how the growth rates evolve
over time as well as the distribution of initial returns. Although in theory a solution to the
problem described above can be found analytically, it is hardly possible in practice due to the
high complexity of the model. Thus, we are using a weighted simulated minimum distance
estimator (SGMM) ωˆN developed by McFadden (1989) and Pakes and Polland (1989) and
already applied by Lanjouw (1998) and Serrano (2011). To estimate the vector of the true
parameters ω0 we will use legal events data on German patent applications. According to
Lanjouw (1998) it is advantageous to fit hazard probabilities instead of mortality rates or
other statistical moments.13 The estimator is the argument that minimizes the norm of the
distance between the vector of true and simulated hazard proportions:
A(ω) ‖hN − ηN(ω)‖ (3)
with ωˆN = arg min
ω
A(ω) ‖hN − ηN(ω)‖
12Simulation results have shown that for the stochastic specification we use for estimation the condition
for gˆl+t (r) to be decreasing in t is always satisfied.
13In this way we are avoiding the selection bias caused by patents which were dropped during the grant
proceedings which might take more than 10 years.
12
• hN is the vector of sample or true hazard proportions,
• ηN(ω) is the vector of simulated hazard proportions (predicted by the model),
• A(ω) = diag
(√
nj/N
hj
)
is the weighting matrix. nj is the number of patents in the
sample for the relevant age-cohort j and hj is the corresponding sample hazard. N is
the sample size.14
In particular, hN consists of three types of hazard proportions:
• HRXNoLOR(t) is the percentage of patents that expire in year t given that they were
active and not endorsed LOR in the previous period t− 1,
• HRL(t) is the percentage of patents which declare LOR in year t given that they were
active and not endorsed LOR in the previous period t− 1, and
• HRXLOR(t) is the percentage of patents that expire in year t given that they were active
and endorsed LOR in the previous period t− 1.
In order to calculate the hazard rates predicted by the model for a parameter set ω in the
first step we will calculate the cut-off value functions {rˆt}Tt=1,
{
gˆl+t (rt)
}T
t=1
, and
{
gˆl−t (rt)
}T
t=1
.
Then, we proceed recursively by first calculating the value functions in the last period,
V˜ K(T, rT ) and V˜
L(T, yT ), and the corresponding cut-off functions rˆT , gˆ
l+
T (rT ), and gˆ
l+
T (rT ).
Subsequently, using these cut-off functions, we approximate the value functions for the year
T − 1. The cut-off value rˆT is easily computed. However, to calculate the cut-off functions
gˆl+T−1(rT−1) and gˆ
l−
T−1(rT−1) we must equate the respective value functions on an M-point
grid of points −→r ≡ {r1 < r2 < ... < rM} and approximate the function at all points via
interpolation.15 We then proceed in the same recursive manner until the first year. Once we
have calculated the cut-off functions for all periods, we simulate S populations of granted
patents.16 Each population consists of 3 · N patents. For each one we take pseudo random
draws from the initial distribution and from the distributions of both types of growth rates,
gkt (t ∈ 2, ..., T ) and glt (t ∈ 1, ..., T ). Afterwards, we pass the initial draws through the
14We follow previous patent renewal studies and use a diagonal matrix that weights each moment according
to the number of observations in each sample hazard to improve the efficiency of the estimator. Since
the hazard proportions of LOR declarations are at least ten times smaller than the hazard proportions of
expiration, we further divide each element in the diagonal matrix by its corresponding sample hazard. This
will give more weight to the distance between the sample and true hazard proportions of declaration HRL(t).
This will improve the estimation efficiency of the parameters that determine the distribution of the LOR
growth rates.
15For all calculations we have used MATLAB (matrix laboratory), a numerical computing environment
developed by MathWorks.
16We set S = 5.
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stochastic process, compare them with the cut-off values in each period and calculate the
vector of simulated hazard proportions. We then average the simulated moments over S
populations. The vector of the average simulated hazard proportions ηN(ω) is then inserted
into the objective function (3). The objective function is minimized using global optimization
algorithms for non-smooth problems implemented in MATLAB.17 The standard errors are
calculated using parametric bootstrap described in Appendix A.3.
3.2 Stochastic Specification
Similar to previous patent renewal studies (Pakes 1986; Schankerman and Pakes 1986; Deng
2011; Serrano 2011) we assume that the initial returns r1 of all granted patents are lognor-
mally distributed with mean µIR and variance σIR:
log(r1) ∼ Normal(µIR, σIR) (4)
With probability 1− θ a patent can become obsolete in the beginning of each period, which
corresponds to an extreme form of value depreciation.
We follow the specification in Schankerman and Pakes (1986) and Serrano (2011) to model the
distributions of the growth rates for the returns from full patent protection, gkt . We assume
a constant growth rate, or more precisely a constant rate of value depreciation, gkt = δ < 1.
We refer to this as the deterministic approach, since the growth rate for all future periods
will be determined already in the first period.18
The growth rates associated with the LOR regime glt are drawn from an exponential distri-
bution:
ql(gl | t) = 1
σlt
exp(− g
l
σlt
) (5)
We allow the standard deviation of these distributions to change monotonically with a
patent's age t, σlt = (φ
l)tσl0. The parameter φ
l is not bounded and may exceed 1. This
allows us to test whether the probability to have a high LOR growth rate is decreasing with
a patent's age.
17Since the objective function is supposed to be non-smooth we apply the Simulated Annealing algorithm
and the Genetic algorithm in the first step. Both are probabilistic search algorithms (see description of
the Global Optimization Toolbox for MATLAB). In the second step we apply a Nelder-Mead-type search
algorithm called fminsearch to find the local minimum.
18We also estimate a model with a different specification for the distributions of the growth rates for the
returns from full patent protection, gkt , where we explicitly allow for learning. This more stochastic approach
follows closely the model specification in Pakes (1986), Lanjouw (1998), and Deng (2011) and is presented in
Appendix A.4.
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We fix the discount factor β = 0.95 to ease the computational burden. Thus, our vector ω
consists of six structural parameters:
µIR, σIR, θ, φ
l, σl0, δ
3.3 Identification
The structural parameters are identified by the size of and the variation in renewal fees, both
across ages and different regimes, as well as the highly non-linear form of the model. Differ-
ent parameter values imply different cut-off values, which in turn imply different aggregate
behavior, and thus different hazard proportions. Nevertheless, since our model is based on
the assumption that patentees will renew patent protection as long as the expected returns
exceed the corresponding renewal fees, we are unable to directly identify the right tail of the
patent value distribution. The value of patents which are renewed until the statutory patent
term is only indirectly identified by the functional form assumptions for the distributions of
initial returns and the growth rates.
All structural parameters are jointly estimated. The parameters φl and σl0 determine the
distribution of the LOR growth rates and are identified by the variation in all three types of
hazard proportions, HRXNoLOR(t), HR
L(t), and HRXLOR(t). If σ
l
0 is small, fewer declarations
will be made throughout all ages. Patents endorsed LOR will expire earlier, increasing the
drop out proportions for intermediate ages and decreasing them for higher ages. Furthermore,
more patent owners of patents not endorsed LOR will choose not to declare LOR and let
their patents expire. φl particularly determines the shape of the HRL(t) curve. For relatively
low values of φl the hazard proportions are sharply decreasing with patent age, whereas for
relatively high values of φl (values close to or above one) they may be increasing throughout
all patent ages.
The parameter θ is identified by the proportions of expiration, HRXNoLOR(t) and HR
X
LOR(t).
Contrary to all other parameters, θ shifts the entire curves up or down and determines the size
of the proportions especially early in the life of a patent, when renewal fees are relatively low.
Given the renewal fees schedule δ and the parameters that determine the initial distribution
of returns, µIR, and σIR, are jointly identified by the variation in all three types of hazard
rates. In particular, higher values of σIR imply a more skewed distribution of patent returns
which cause higher dropout rates for intermediate ages and lower dropout rates for higher
ages, when renewal fees are highest. Lower values of σIR have the opposite effect. δ mainly
determines the variation in hazard proportions when patents get closer to their expiration
date.
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4 Data
We use data on German patent applications provided by the German Patent and Trademark
Office (DPMA) updated as of Dec. 24, 2008.19 This data set contains information on all
legal events, especially about patent renewals and declarations of the willingness to license
according to Sec. 23 of the German Patent Act. For estimation, we use granted patent
applications with effect in Germany from cohorts 1983-1988 for which we observe the full
patent term.20 Since we do not explicitly model the application and examination stages
which precede the patent stage, we do not consider renewal and declaration decisions in
the years the patent has not been granted. Usually high lump-sum costs are involved in
both stages and the patent system offers several additional options to the patent applicants,
too. One of them is the possibility to defer the examination of the patent for up to seven
years. Another one is to stop or accelerate examination during the grant procedure. The
consequence of these additional costs and options which are not captured by our model is
that they could create a selection effect in the data even in the periods after grant. At any
age, the probability of observing an expiration decision is likely to differ between patents
which have just been granted and those that had been granted many years ago. The same
applies to the probability to observe the decision to declare LOR. To avoid these biases in
the calculation of the sample hazard proportions we have excluded the decisions in the first
two years after grant, too.21
After excluding patents which expired within the first two years after they had been granted
(12% of all granted patents) we were left with 211,869 patents divided in six cohorts. LOR
has been declared for 12,878 (6.08%) of them. For 3,557 patents the LOR declaration was
made when the patent application was still pending or within the first two years after grant.
These LOR declarations were not considered for the calculation of the hazard proportions.
For 35,410 (16.7%) patents, protection has been renewed for the full patent term.
The weighted sample hazard proportions obtained for patent ages 5 to 20 (respectively 6 to
19Due to legal provisions, the DPMA has to announce the publication of certain legal documents and
events, e.g., publications of patent applications, patent grants, translations of European and PCT patent
claims, as well as their changes. The announcement itself is made by a notice that appears in the weekly
published Patent Gazette. All the information used for the publication in the Patent Gazette is stored in
the PU-Band, tagged with the date the particular event was announced in the Patent Gazette (on average 3
months after the event). The first entry in the data we use dates back to 31 March 1981.
20Besides truncation issues, the reason for not choosing younger cohorts was a legal amendment in 1992
which allowed applicants to withdraw the LOR declaration as long as there had not been any request for a
license. This option is not incorporated in our model. Nevertheless, in the chosen cohorts willingness to license
was withdrawn only in 10 cases, which leaves our model assumption of the declaration being irrevocable still
justifiable.
21The hazard proportions did not change considerably when we excluded the first three or four years after
grant.
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20) are presented in Figures 4-6.22 The theoretical model predicts that the hazard propor-
tions of expiration for patents endorsed, as well as for patents not endorsed LOR should be
monotonically increasing in patent age due to the selection effect. However, this is not the
case for some intermediate ages. Furthermore, there is a sharp increase for older ages. The
explanation is easily found by looking at the disaggregated hazard proportions of expiration.
For each cohort there are two kinks in the elsewise monotonically increasing curves which can
be attributed to the events surrounding the dot-com bubble in Germany. The sharp decline
in hazard proportions in 1998 can be associated with the emergence of the New Economy,
whereas the jump in 2002 can be associated with its burst. Both events significantly affected
the overall economic development in Germany. To capture the impact of these shocks we
allow the obsolescence rate 1− θ to differ in 1998 (1− θ1998) and 2002 (1− θ2002). We assume
that both shocks were unexpected by the patent owners.23 The hazard proportions of LOR
declarations follow an inverted-U-shaped curve. They increase from 0.53% in year 5 to 0.81%
in year 13, decrease for the following years, and reach the minimum in year 20 with 0.37%.
The patent renewal fee schedule for the time span under consideration is provided in Appendix
A.2. There was one major change to the fee structure in Jan. 1, 2000. The renewal fee for
each year was increased by 15%. Following Lanjouw (1998) we assume that the changes
were anticipated by the patentees such that they always have correct expectations about the
renewal fee schedule that they will face in the future.24
5 Estimation Results
The estimation results are presented in Table 1.25 We begin with a discussion of the overall fit
of the model and then turn to the interpretation of the parameter estimates. In the previous
literature two measures were used to evaluate how well the estimated model fits the data.
First, one can look at how well the curves of the simulated hazard proportions calculated
using the estimated parameters mimic the curves of the true hazard rates. In Figures 4-6
we plot the true and the weighted simulated hazard rates for the cohorts 1983-1988. As
expected, the model fits the curves of hazard proportions particularly well for ages which
received the highest weight in the estimation. However, it fails to capture the rather sharp
22Since patent examination takes at least two years and due to subsetting we do not observe hazard
proportions for the first 4, respectively 5 years.
23Alternatively, we could have implemented these shocks as a change in the distribution of the growth
rates. However, this would considerably complicate the model and increase the computational burden.
24To avoid solving the dynamic optimization problem for each cohort separately we decided to calculate a
single renewal fee schedule as a weighted average of the renewal fee schedules of all cohorts. We are aware
that this simplification may potentially bias our estimates.
25We provide the estimation of the stochastic model with learning in Appendix A.4. The main results do
not differ significantly.
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Parameter Model 1 (s.e.)†
β (fixed) 0.950
µIR 8.286 (0.0630)
σIR 1.435 (0.0239)
θ 0.924 (0.0006)
θ1998 0.985 (0.0011)
θ2002 0.835 (0.0020)
δ 0.968 (0.0030)
φl 0.973 (0.0002)
σl0 0.204 (0.0009)
Age-Cohort Cells 282
Sample Size 211,869
Simulation Size 635,607
MSEAll
‡ 0.000923
V arAll(hN ) 0.0055
1−MSEAll/V arAll(hN ) 0.8323
†Calculated using parametric bootstrap.
‡Calculated as the sum of squared residuals divided by the number of age-cohort cells.
Table 1: Parameter Estimates
increase in the hazards of expiration in the final ages. Regarding the hazard proportions of
declaration the model slightly underestimates them but captures the decrease for higher ages
reasonably well. Another performance indicator is the fraction of the variation in the true
hazard rates that can be explained by the model. Therefore, we calculate the Mean Square
Error (MSE) defined as the sum of squared residuals divided by the number of age-cohort
cells. A low MSE relative to the variance in the sample hazard proportions suggests a good
fit. With a MSE value of 9.23 e−4 the model is able to explain 83.23% of the overall variation
in the hazard proportions.26
Depreciation dynamics The distribution of the initial returns is determined by the pa-
rameters µIR and σIR. The mean initial return was 16,019e (1,417e).27 The distribution
was skewed with a median initial return of 5,714e (348e). The parameters δ and θ together
determine the depreciation of the value of patent protection over time. The obsolescence
rate, defined as 1 − θ, was 7.60% meaning that 50.91% of all patents became worthless to
26The unweighted MSE is somewhat higher than reported in other patent renewal studies where the
explained variation typically exceeds 90%. This is reasonable, since we have used a different weighting
scheme. The weighting matrix A(ω) in the objective function was constructed such that hazard proportions
of LOR declaration have received relatively higher weights. The reported MSE does not take this weighting
scheme into account.
27All monetary values are in units of 2002e calculated for cohort 1983. Standard errors are reported in
parentheses.
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Figure 4: Hazard Proportions of Expiration - Patents Not Endorsed LOR
their owners after ten years. Additionally, we confirm the finding by Schankerman (1998)
that economic shocks, positive as well as negative, significantly influence the value of patents.
The estimated obsolescence rates for the years 1998 and 2002, 1 − θ1998 and 1 − θ2002, are
higher, respectively lower. In 1998, during the economic upturn, only 1.52% of patents and
in 2002, when the economic crisis became most severe, as many as 16.49% of patents were
considered obsolete. If the patents did not become obsolete the returns depreciated by 3.2%
each year. This is a relatively small value. However, the obsolescence rate already accounts
for a large part of the overall depreciation in patent value.
Distribution of the value of exclusivity One of the major contributions of this paper
is the estimation of the distribution of the value of exclusivity. This was defined as 1 minus
the fraction of returns from patent protection that remain if the patentee declares LOR,
maintaining only a right to reasonable remuneration. The estimated parameters φl and σl0
determine this distribution across all German patents. One can see in Table 2 that in the
first year, 2.23% of the patent owners would still be able to realize 75% of the returns from
full patent protection even if they gave up exclusivity. For 0.63% of the patents the returns
could even be increased if they waived their exclusive right. The declaration of the LOR
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Figure 5: Hazard Proportions of LOR Declaration
is a binding commitment to make licenses available at a reasonable fee. This commitment
may increase the diffusion of the technology, and hence the licensing revenues. Especially
if the setup costs required for using a technology are high, a guarantee that licenses will be
available at a reasonable price could foster the demand for the technology (Shepard 1987;
Farrell and Gallini 1988).
Since φl is smaller than 1 the probabilities to draw relatively high LOR growth rates are
decreasing with patent age. For patents still alive at age 20 the likelihood of being able
to realize higher returns after declaring LOR than with full patent protection falls to only
0.02% and the likelihood of being able to realize 75% of the returns, to 0.16%. As many as
1.38% of the patents would still be able to retain at least 50% of the returns if they gave
up exclusivity. In reverse, this means that exclusivity becomes relatively more important
for returns appropriation with patent age. The older the patent the bigger is the fraction of
returns to holding a patent which is associated with the right to exclude others and foreclose
competition. Although returns to patent protection decrease with patent age, patents' con-
tribution to static inefficiency, i.e., welfare losses, increases in relative terms. Older patents
are likely to be more detrimental to the society. This result confirms previous findings (e.g.,
Cornelli and Schankerman 1999; Baudry and Dumont 2009) that the optimal patent renewal
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Figure 6: Hazard Proportions of Expiration - Patents Endorsed LOR
fees should be sharply increasing towards the end of patent life to minimize the social cost.
6 Policy Implications
6.1 The Value of Patent Rights
We use the estimated parameters to calculate the distribution of the value of patent rights
for patents from cohort 1983. To do this, we draw a population of 500,000 patents from the
initial distribution and pass them through the model. We then use German deflation factors
to calculate the discounted present value of the stream of returns, net of discounted renewal
fees for each patent.
In Table 3 we report the distributions at three different ages, at age 1, which corresponds to
the overall value of patent protection, at age 5, and at age 10. For the distribution of the
overall patent value we distinguished between the value of patents for which LOR has been
declared and patents which have never been endorsed LOR. As already reported in previous
studies, we observe that the distribution is very skewed with most of the value generated by
only a small fraction of patents. The average patent value was 122,925 with 50% being worth
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Age Pr(glt ≥ 1.00) Pr(glt ≥ 0.75) Pr(glt ≥ 0.50)
1 0.63% (0.0144)† 2.23% (0.0383) 7.93% (0.0907)
2 0.55% (0.0125) 2.01% (0.0345) 7.39% (0.0847)
3 0.47% (0.0108) 1.80% (0.0310) 6.87% (0.0789)
4 0.41% (0.0094) 1.61% (0.0278) 6.37% (0.0735)
5 0.35% (0.0081) 1.43% (0.0249) 5.90% (0.0684)
6 0.30% (0.0069) 1.27% (0.0222) 5.45% (0.0635)
... ... ... ...
18 0.03% (0.0009) 0.23% (0.0049) 1.74% (0.0248)
19 0.02% (0.0007) 0.19% (0.0043) 1.55% (0.0229)
20 0.02% (0.0006) 0.16% (0.0037) 1.38% (0.0211)
†Standard errors in parentheses.
Table 2: Evolution of LOR Growth Rates
less than 32,845e. Only 5% of the patents were worth more than 493,017e and for 1% the
value even exceeded 1,392,057e. The distribution gets more skewed at age 5 and even more
so at age 10 after many patents have become obsolete.
We estimate somewhat higher patent values compared to previous patent renewal studies.
Using patent data for cohorts 1950-1979 Pakes (1986) reports a mean value per German
patent of 46,560e. Lanjouw (1998), using patents from cohorts 1953-80 in four technological
areas, reports somewhat lower average values for patents in computers and textiles, and
higher values for patents in engines and pharmaceuticals. However, both studies were using
stochastic models which allowed for learning. The only study directly comparable to ours is
Schankerman and Pakes (1986). Using the same data as in Pakes (1986) but a deterministic
model they estimate a mean patent value at age 5 of 55,069e for the 1970 cohort. According
to our results, the average value of patent protection at age 5 for the 1983 cohort was
higher, with 69,026e. We have used a sample of German patents from cohorts 1983-1988
for estimation. There are several explanations for the discrepancy. Schankerman (1998) and
Schankerman and Pakes (1986) indicate that patent values have been increasing over time.
Furthermore, data on German patents used for estimation in previous studies preceded the
German reunification in 1990 whereas our data almost exclusively cover the post-reunification
era. The increased market size should have had a significant effect on the private value of
German patent rights. There are several explanations for this discrepancy. Schankerman
and Pakes (1986) and Schankerman (1998) indicate that patent values have been increasing
over time. Furthermore, data on German patents used for estimation in previous studies
preceded the German reunification in 1990 whereas our data almost exclusively covers the
post-reunification era. The increased market size should have had a significant effect on the
private value of German patent rights.
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at Age 10 at Age 5 at Age 1
Percentile All All No LOR Endorsed LOR
50 0 9,838 32,845 33,383 26,366
(s.e.) (0) (396) (1,730) (1,775) (1,239)
75 12,781 50,402 103,687 105,982 71,885
(s.e.) (466) (2440) (6,199) (6,348) (4,290)
90 65,505 159,192 277,082 281,885 198,308
(s.e.) (2,909) (9115) (18,933) (19,248) (15,263)
95 136,858 299,285 493,017 499,854 362,173
(s.e.) (7,052) (19022) (36,531) (37,096) (30,341)
99 455,827 900,290 1,392,057 1,400,844 1,236,523
(s.e.) (30,200) (70386) (122,695) (123,907) (115,550)
99.9 1,599,868 2,987,310 4,468,806 4,469,337 4,418,714
(s.e.) (131,764) (285310) (473,114) (481,255) (483,024)
Mean 29,260 69,026 122,925 124,601 96,898
(s.e.) (1,738) (4,673) (9,236) (9,379) (7,472)
Table 3: Value Distributions in 2002e
Patents endorsed LOR are on average more valuable than patents which have never been
endorsed LOR. This confirms the result in Rudyk (2012) where he used regression analysis
to show that a declaration is less likely for patents of presumably higher value. The average
value of a patent endorsed LOR was 96,898e, 22.23% lower than the average value of a
patent never endorsed LOR. The median value was 26,366e and 10% of all patents for
which LOR has been declared were even worth more than 198,308e. Since LOR can be
declared throughout the whole patent life, we subtract the returns generated before the LOR
declaration and calculate the distribution of the value from patent protection which has been
generated during the LOR regime. This distribution looks even more skewed with a mean
value of 62,312e and a median value of 8,474e (see Table 4). 10% of patents endorsed LOR
were even able to accumulate more than 130,074e in net returns during the LOR regime. The
result is surprising, since the common opinion is that LOR is declared only for patents which
are peripheral or have already become worthless to their owners. Our estimates, however,
suggest that a substantial part of the value of patents for which LOR had been declared, on
average 64.31%, was generated after the declaration.
Percentile 50 75 90 95 99 99.9 Mean
Value 8,474 39,279 130,074 255,510 886,023 3,188,420 62,312
(s.e.) (472) (2,337) (9,171) (19,981) (86,983) (384,581) (4,777)
Table 4: Value Realized During the LOR Regime in 2002e
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6.2 Counterfactual Analysis
License of right We perform a counterfactual policy experiment where we ban the possi-
bility to declare LOR from the patent system. We then look at how the overall value provided
by the German patent system would change, as well as the consequences for the revenues
of the German patent office. According to our calculations, the option value of the LOR
system is positive. The value of all patents in the simulated cohort falls by 0.51% (0.02%),
once we exclude the option to declare LOR from the model. The mean patent value drops by
620e (52e). However, the amount of total renewal fees paid by the patentees increases by
2.21% (0.05%). Hence, the LOR system is associated with costs for the German patent office.
Nevertheless, these costs correspond to only 12.16% of the additional private value it cre-
ates. Overall, the results indicate that a license of right provision can contribute to a better
functioning of a patent system. It increases access to patented inventions without depriving
patent owners of their returns. Although it encourages to maintain patent protection for a
longer period licenses are available at reasonable terms to any third party. Furthermore, the
legislator can design the LOR incentive structure in a way as to discourage welfare decreasing
declarations.
Of the 500,000 simulated patents for cohort 1983, 6.05% (0.05%) have declared LOR. The
average declaration in the sample data was 6.08%. Now, we divide patents endorsed LOR
according to the motives of declaration. A declaration is assigned to the cost-saving motive
if the primary reason for the declaration was to profit from the cost reduction such that the
patent would not have been renewed otherwise. These declarations can be considered as un-
ambiguously welfare decreasing. A declaration is assigned to the commitment motive if the
choice for the patentee was either to renew with full patent protection or to declare LOR. In
this case the patent would have existed even without the possibility to declare LOR at least
for one more year, maintaining the right to exclude others. Instead, the patentee commits to
license his invention non-exclusively. These declarations can potentially be welfare increas-
ing. According to the simulation results presented in Table 5, only less than 4.41% of all
declarations were unambiguously welfare decreasing. In contrast, 95.59% of the declarations
were made because the patentee expected higher profits in the LOR regime compared to the
regime with full patent protection. However, this division is not constant for all patent ages.
In the first 5 years, 99.70% of all declarations could be assigned to the commitment motive.
This is not surprising since the renewal fees in the first five years are almost negligible. In
contrast, of all declarations made in the last five years of the statutory patent term, only
80.25% could be assigned to the commitment motive and 19.75% to the cost-saving motive.
Since the renewal fees in Germany are increasing progressively, they are highest in this five-
year period. The corollary from this result is that the present cost structure that guarantees
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Age 1-5 6-10 11-15 16-20 1-20
Cost-Saving Motive 0.30% 4.07% 12.51% 19.75% 4.41%
Commitment Motive 99.70% 95.93% 87.49% 80.25% 95.59%
(s.e.) (0.05%) (0.30%) (0.58%) (1.05%) (0.18%)
Table 5: Motive for LOR Declaration
a 50% fee reduction for all declarations might not be welfare optimizing. To improve welfare
one could decrease the fee reduction rate for late LOR declarations and increase it for early
ones. The older the patent for which LOR is declared the lower should be the subsidy. This
would incentivize early declarations and discourage welfare decreasing declarations for older
patents.28
Compulsory licensing In our second counterfactual experiment we measure the cost of
compulsory licensing (CL) requirements for the patent owners. We adapt our model and
oblige every patent to declare LOR on the day of application, making licensing compulsory.
Again, using the estimated parameters for German patent data we calculate the patent
value assuming a 50% reduction in renewal fees. Compared to the present patent system in
Germany the introduction of the compulsory licensing requirement for all patents would lead
to a decrease in overall value by 81.00% (0.17%) or 99,572e (7,344e) on average. We are
aware that this result might overstate the real losses. First, patentees facing a compulsory
licensing could adjust their strategies, e.g., by protecting their invention via secrecy, and
avoid the burden of compulsory licensing. For example they may intensify the use of other
means of IP protection like trade secrets or design patents. Secondly, our results depend
on the functional form assumption for the distribution of the growth rates in case of LOR.
We have chosen an exponential probability distribution which is a constantly decreasing
function. This makes very low LOR growth rates, and hence low returns in case of CL very
probable. Nevertheless, the results indicate that making licensing compulsory to all patent
holders may deprive the system of much of its incentive power. Contrary to license of right
it might not be advisable to apply compulsory licensing to the patent system as a whole.
However, it can be beneficial to society to require licenses being available at reasonable terms
for standard-related patents for interoperability purposes.29 The same applies to patents in
cumulative innovation fields. In some cases providing access to patented technology that
28Theoretically, one could use the model developed in this article and the estimated parameters to calculate
the welfare optimizing fee structure. The results would highly depend on the employed welfare function. These
welfare function should relate the welfare derived from an invention protected by a patent with full patent
protection to the welfare derived from the same invention protected by a patent without the exclusive right
and to the welfare without any patent protection. We leave this to future research.
29Hilty and Geiger (2005) propose a mandatory license of right declaration for patents in component
technologies such as the software sector.
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follow-on inventions build upon might benefit welfare by far more than the losses in private
value from patent protection if exclusivity is removed.
7 Conclusion
The main empirical findings can be summarized as follows. We confirm the result from pre-
vious patent renewal studies that the distribution of the private value from patent protection
is very skewed. Additionally, we estimate that the distribution of the value of exclusivity is
very skewed, too. We define the value of exclusivity as those returns that the patent owner
would forfeit by giving up his right to exclude others in return for only a right to reasonable
remuneration. Less than 7.93% of all patents would be able to maintain at least 50% of the
returns from patent protection if they gave up exclusivity in the first year, and only 2.23%
would be able to maintain at least 75%. Interestingly, a small fraction of patents, estimated
to be around 0.63%, can even profit from a commitment to make licenses available to every-
one. Furthermore, the value of exclusivity becomes more important with patent age. The
older the patent the lower is the probability that the patentee will be able to retain a larger
part of his revenues without the possibility to exclude others.
Moreover, the model allowed us to identify declarations which were unambiguously welfare
decreasing. We estimate for the 1983 cohort of patents that 4.41% of all declaration were
made only because of the 50% reduction in maintenance fees. Without the LOR option these
patents would not have been renewed. The fraction of such declarations was almost negligible
for young patents but has increased rapidly for older ones.
On average, patents endorsed LOR were less valuable to their owners than patents never
endorsed LOR by 22.23%. However, a major part of the value of patents endorsed LOR has
been generated during the LOR regime.
Future research should look at the differences between technological areas. We know that
LOR is mostly never used in discrete technologies like chemistry or biotechnology whereas
it is widely used in complex technologies. LOR was declared for almost 11.41% of patents
in electrical engineering and 8.02% in mechanical engineering. For some subclasses of these
technology fields the numbers were even higher. The results would show how the distribution
of the value of exclusivity differs across different complex technologies. Besides, the higher
usage rates could help to improve the identification of the model parameters.
The results from the counterfactual experiments which we have performed using the esti-
mated parameters show very useful insights, too. Although, as we argue, the estimated loss
in private returns from patent protection of 81.00% that would follow an introduction of a
compulsory licensing system constitutes only an upper bound, the sheer number is astonish-
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Figure 7: Time Line
ing. Compulsory licensing would have considerably undermined the incentive effect of the
patent system.
The possibility to declare LOR in the German patent system has somewhat different impli-
cations. Without this option, the private returns from patent protection of all patents would
have fallen by 0.51%. However, the renewal fees collected by the German patent office would
have risen by 2.21%. A LOR system is costly to implement for the patent office but these
costs are only a fraction of the additional private value created in the patent system. The
model and the estimated distributions could further be used to precisely assess the effects on
the social welfare as well as to determine the welfare optimizing design of the LOR system.
Certainly, the findings should differ across technology areas.
The basic trade-off is that on the one hand the LOR system provides incentives to open the
access to patented inventions. On the other hand, the reduction in renewal fees, which are
increasing with a patent's maturity, might result in too strong incentives to maintain patent
protection. We observe that on average LOR was declared 8.5 years after the application
date and the patents were renewed for additional 6 years, resulting in longer-living patents
(2.5 years longer compared to patents without LOR).
Consider a simple model. Assume for simplicity the patentee has full information about all
future returns from patent protection at the filing date. Without the possibility to declare
LOR the patent owner would choose to let his patent expire at time T
NL
. Alternatively, the
patent owner can also opt to declare LOR. The LOR regime is associated with an optimal
time T for the declaration and an optimal time T
L
for the expiration (see Figure 7). The
difference T
NL − T denotes the period when the welfare effect from LOR will be positive,
since exclusivity will be removed. The difference T
L − TNL denotes the period when the
welfare effect will be negative, since patent protection would have been extended. Even if
during this period the patent were endorsed LOR a situation without any protection would
increase welfare.
If the patentee indeed chooses to declare LOR he will do it earlier (T decreases) and let
the patent expire later (T
L
increases) the higher will be his returns from patent protection
during the LOR regime and the higher the reduction in renewal fees. Assuming a welfare
function for the different regimes of protectionno patent protection, patent protection with
exclusivity, patent protection without exclusivity (LOR)such that one could relate the wel-
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fare increasing effects to the welfare decreasing effects, one ought to be able to calculate the
welfare optimizing fee reduction rate (currently 5). If the government sets only a low discount
rate it will only attract patents with a positive welfare contribution into the LOR regime.
But the discount rate will be too low for the patent owners to choose the optimal time of
declaration. Many patentees will choose too declare later than socially optimal, or choose
not to declare LOR at all. On the other hand, if the government sets a high discount rate
it will allow patents with a higher welfare contribution to choose the socially optimal time
for the declaration. But it would also encourage patents with negative welfare contributions
into the LOR regime. This optimal discount rate should balance those effects.
In this setting one could also analyze whether there are other applicable incentive mecha-
nisms besides a uniform discount rate which could discourage patents with negative welfare
contribution to declare LOR, but maintain the incentives for patents with a positive one.
One possibility is to design individual contracts for each patent owner combining high dis-
count rates for early declarations with an early commitment to non-exclusive licensing, and
low discount rates for declarations for older patents. A practical implementation would be
to reduce the discount rate with the age of the patent at declaration. This mechanism could
possibly ensure that patent owners take welfare optimizing decisions.
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A Appendix
A.1 Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1
For the proof of parts (i) and (ii) it suffices to show the properties for V˜ L(t, yt) and V˜
K(t, rt)
in rt. For a given LOR growth rate g
l
t the same properties apply for yt.
Let a be the year of declaration (if chosen). Remember, Fgk(u
k | t) and Fgl(ul | t) are
independent of returns and yt = g
l
art = g
l
ag
k
t rt−1.
Proofs are done by induction.
(i)
Let's look at the last period t = T :
V˜ K(T, rT ) = rT − fT and V˜ L(T, yT ) = yT − fT2 = glarT − fT2 are clearly increasing in rT .
Now, let's look at the periods t < T :
Assume that for an arbitrary r < r′: V˜ L(t+ 1, glag
k
t+1r) < V˜
L(t+ 1, glag
k
t+1r
′) .
Then, V˜L(t+ 1, g
l
ag
k
t+1r) ≤ V˜L(t+ 1, glagkt+1r′)
and E
[
V˜L(t+ 1, g
l
ag
k
t+1r)
]
≤ E
[
V˜L(t+ 1, g
l
ag
k
t+1r
′)
]
.
Then,
V˜ L(t, glar) = −ft2 + glar + βE
[
V˜L(t+ 1, g
l
ag
k
t+1r)
]
<
< −ft
2
+ glar
′ + βE
[
V˜L(t+ 1, g
l
ag
k
t+1r
′)
]
= V˜ L(t, glar
′).
Now, assume that for r < r′: V˜ K(t+ 1, gkt+1r) < V˜
K(t+ 1, gkt+1r
′).
We know from above that V˜ L(t+ 1, gltg
k
t+1r) < V˜
L(t+ 1, gltg
k
t+1r
′).
This means that V˜K(t+ 1, g
k
t+1r, g
l
tg
k
t+1r) ≤ V˜K(t+ 1, gkt+1r′, gltgkt+1r′)
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and E
[
V˜K(t+ 1, g
k
t+1r, g
l
tg
k
t+1r)
]
≤ E
[
V˜K(t+ 1, g
k
t+1r
′, gltg
k
t+1r
′)
]
.
Then,
V˜ K(t, r) = −ft + r + βE
[
V˜K(t+ 1, g
k
t+1r, g
l
tg
k
t+1r)
]
<
< −ft + r′ + βE
[
V˜K(t+ 1, g
k
t+1r
′, gltg
k
t+1r
′)
]
= V˜ K(t, r′).
(ii)
V˜ L(T, yT ) and V˜
K(T, rT ) are clearly continuous in rT . To prove continuity in rt for all t
assume that V˜K(t, rt, yt) and V˜L(t, yt) are continuous in rt for an arbitrary t.
V˜K(t − 1, rt−1, yt−1) and V˜L(t − 1, yt−1) will be continuous in rt−1 if V˜ K(t − 1, rt−1) and
V˜ L(t − 1, yt−1) are continuous in rt−1. In turn, V˜ K(t − 1, rt−1) and V˜ L(t − 1, yt−1) will be
continuous in rt−1 if their option values E
[
V˜K(t, rt, yt) | rt−1
]
and E
[
V˜L(t, yt) | rt−1, gla
]
are
continuous in rt−1.
The option values will be continuous in rt−1 if for every sequence (rnt−1), such that lim(r
n
t−1) =
rt−1, we can show that
lim
rnt−1→rt−1
E
[
V˜K(t, rt, yt) | rnt−1
]
= E
[
V˜K(t, rt, yt) | rt−1
]
and
lim
rnt−1→rt−1
E
[
V˜L(t, yt) | rnt−1, gla
]
= E
[
V˜L(t, yt) | rt−1, gla
]
.
Since Fgk(u
k | t) and Fgl(ul | t) are independent of rt, it must be that
lim
rnt−1→rt−1
E
[
V˜K(t, rt, yt) | rnt−1
]
=
=
´ ´
lim
rnt−1→rt−1
[
V˜K(t, g
k
t r
n
t−1, g
l
tg
k
t r
n
t−1)
]
dFgk(du
k | t)dFgl(dul | t) =
=
´ ´ [
V˜K(t, g
k
t rt−1, g
l
tg
k
t rt−1)
]
dFgk(du
k | t)dFgl(dul | t).
The last equality follows because V˜K(t, rt, yt) is continuous in rt−1 (remember that yt =
gltg
k
t rt−1 and rt = g
k
t rt−1 are both continuous in rt−1).
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The proof for
lim
rnt−1→rt−1
E
[
V˜L(t, yt) | rnt−1, gla
]
= E
[
V˜L(t, yt) | rt−1, gla
]
is identical.
(iii):
In t = T the option value is always 0. The option value in t = T − 1 must be at least 0
since the patentee has always the choice to let the patent expire (X). Let's hold r and gl
fixed. Since the renewal fees are increasing in t, it must be that V˜ K(T − 1, r) ≥ V˜ K(T, r)
and V˜ L(T − 1, y) ≥ V˜ L(T, y).
By assumption, Fgl(u
l | t) and Fgk(uk | t) are increasing in t (in the sense of first-order
stochastic dominance) making higher growth rates less likely for older patents. Thus, the
property that V˜ K(t− 1, r) ≥ V˜ K(t, r) and V˜ L(t− 1, y) ≥ V˜ L(t, y) must hold for the general
case:
Assume that V˜ L(t+ 1, y) ≤ V˜ L(t, y)⇒ V˜L(t+ 1, y) ≤ V˜L(t, y).
Thus,
E
[
V˜L(t+ 1, g
lgkt+1r)
]
≤ E
[
V˜L(t, g
lgkt r)
]
, since Fgk(u
k | t) ≤ Fgk(uk | t+ 1).
Then,
V˜ L(t, y) = −ft
2
+ y + βE
[
V˜L(t+ 1, g
lgkt+1r)
]
≤
≤ −ft−1
2
+ y + βE
[
V˜L(t, g
lgkt r)
]
= V˜ L(t− 1, y).
Now, assume that V˜ K(t+ 1, r) ≤ V˜ K(t, r).
We know that V˜ L(t+ 1, y) ≤ V˜ L(t, y) and thus it must be that
V˜K(t+ 1, r, y) ≤ V˜K(t, r, y).
Therefore,
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E
[
V˜K(t+ 1, g
k
t+1r, g
l
t+1g
k
t+1r)
]
≤ E
[
V˜K(t, g
k
t r, g
l
tg
k
t r)
]
,
since Fgk(u
k | t) ≤ Fgk(uk | t+ 1) and Fgl(ul | t) ≤ Fgl(ul | t+ 1).
With ft−1 < ft, we can easily conclude that
V˜ K(t, r) = −ft + r + E
[
V˜K(t+ 1, g
k
t+1r, g
l
t+1g
k
t+1r)
]
≤
≤ −ft−1 + r + E
[
V˜K(t, g
k
t r, g
l
tg
k
t r)
]
= V˜ K(t− 1, y).
Proof of Proposition 1
(i)
In this case the patentee is indifferent between (L) and (X). We know that the value func-
tion V˜ L(t, gltr) is weakly increasing in returns r. Thus, if the per period returns from full
patent protection are increasing, gˆl− must be decreasing with r to maintain the equality in
V˜ L(t, gˆl−t r) = 0.
(ii)
The patent owner has to choose between (K) and (L).
Consider the last period T :
One can easily calculate that gˆl+T = 1− fT2r and increasing in r.
The higher r, the smaller is the cost reduction relative to possible losses in patent returns
due to the LOR declaration.
Now, consider period t < T :
gˆl+t is defined as
V˜ K(t, r)− V˜ L(t, gˆl+t r) = −ft2 + r − gˆl+t r+
+β
{
E
[
V˜K(t+ 1, g
k
t+1r, g
l
t+1g
k
t+1r)
]
− E
[
V˜L(t+ 1, g
k
t+1r, gˆ
l+
t g
k
t+1r)
]}
= 0.
After applying the implicit function theorem:
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∂gˆl+t
∂r
= − ∂(V˜ Kt (.)−V˜ Lt (.))/∂r
∂(V˜ Kt (.)−V˜ Lt (.))/∂gˆl+t
=
1−glt+β
∂{E[V˜K (.)]−E[V˜L(.)]}
∂r
r+β
∂E[V˜L(.)]
∂gˆl+t
The expression will be positive if and only if
1 + β
∂{E[V˜K(.)]−E[V˜L(.)]}
∂r
> gˆl+t .
As long as this inequality holds, gˆl+t will be increasing in r. This will in turn depend on the
exact stochastic specification of the model, especially on how we model the distributions of
the growth rates.
Proof of Proposition 2
Take an arbitrary gl. The cut-off value rˆt is defined as V˜
K(t, rˆt) = 0 and rˆt+1 as V˜
K(t +
1, rˆt+1) = 0. From Lemma 1 we know that V˜
K(.) is increasing in r and non-increasing in t.
Thus, to maintain equality in both equations it must be that rˆt+1 ≥ rˆt .
Proof of Proposition 3
(i)
In this case the patent owner is indifferent between (L) and (X). We know from Lemma 1
that V˜ L(t, yt) is increasing in rt and non-increasing in t. Thus, if we take the same returns
rt = rt+1 = r in two consecutive periods, then gˆ
l−
t (r), which is defined as the solution to
V˜ L(t, y) = gˆl−t r − 12ft + βE
[
V˜L(t+ 1, gˆ
l−
t g
k
t+1r)
]
= 0,
must be at least as large as gˆl−t−1(r).
(ii)
The patent owner is indifferent between (L) and (K) if glt = gˆ
l+
t . The cut-off function gˆ
l+
t (rt)
is implicitly defined in
V˜ L(t, gˆl+t rt) = gˆ
l+
t rt − 12ft + βE
[
V˜L(t+ 1, gˆ
l+
t g
k
t+1rt)
]
=
= rt − ft + βE
[
V˜K(t+ 1, g
k
t+1rt, g
l
t+1g
k
t+1rt)
]
= V˜ K(t, rt).
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Let's look at the last two periods and assume rT−1 = rT = r and yT−1 = yT = y (glT−1 = g
l
T ).
The option values in the last period are always 0 and we can easily calculate:
gˆl+T (rT ) = 1− fT2r .
Let's look whether gˆl+T (r) ≤ gˆl+T−1(r).
Since E
[
V˜L(T, g
l
T−1g
k
T r)
]
is increasing in glT−1 we have to show that
V˜ K(T − 1, r)− V˜ L(T − 1, gˆl+T r) ≤ 0 (with gˆl+T (r) = 1− fT2r ).
We know that
V˜ K(T − 1, r)− V˜ L(T − 1, gˆl+T r) =
r − fT−1 + βE
[
V˜K(T, g
k
T r, g
l
Tg
k
T r)
]
− gˆl+T r + fT−12 − βE
[
V˜L(T, gˆ
l+
T g
k
T r)
]
=
after inserting gˆl+T (rT ) = 1− fT2r
= fT
2
− fT−1
2
+ β
{
E
[
V˜K(T, g
k
T r, g
l
Tg
k
T r)
]
− E
[
V˜L(T, (1− fT2r )gkT r)
]}
=
= fT
2
− fT−1
2
+ β
{
E
[
V˜K(T, g
k
T r, g
l
Tg
k
T r)
]
− E
[
V˜L(T, g
k
T (r − fT2 )
]}
.
Already for the last two periods we see that whether gˆl+T (r) ≤ gˆl+T−1(r) will depend on whether
the term E
[
V˜K(T, g
k
T r, g
l
Tg
k
T r)
]
−E
[
V˜L(T, g
k
T (r − fT2 )
]
will exceed cost difference fT
2
− fT−1
2
.
This in turn will depend on the exact stochastic specification as well as the fee structure.
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A.2 Renewal Fee Schedules for Cohorts 1983-1988
year before January 01, 2002 after January 01, 2002
1 0 0
2 0 0
3 51.13 70
4 51.13 70
5 76.69 90
6 115.04 130
7 153.39 180
8 204.52 240
9 255.65 290
10 306.78 350
11 409.03 470
12 536.86 620
13 664.68 760
14 792.50 910
15 920.33 1060
16 1073.71 1230
17 1227.10 1410
18 1380.49 1590
19 1533.88 1760
20 1687.26 1940
Table 6: Renewal Fee Schedules in e
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A.3 Parametric Bootstrap
Since we do not know the empirical distribution of the observed hazard rates we will apply a
parametric bootstrap method to estimate the standard errors of the parameters ω. Instead
of simulating bootstrap samples that are i.i.d. from the empirical distribution as it is done in
non-parametric bootstrap methods, we simulate bootstrap samples that are i.i.d. from the
estimated parametric model. Following Efron and Tibshirani (1993) we apply the following
bootstrap algorithm:
1. Use the estimated parameters ωˆ∗ and generate a random sample of N patents.
2. Simulate the decisions resulting from the model specification and obtain the sequence
of pseudo hazard rates η(ωˆ∗).
3. Minimize the loss function in function 3 using η(ωˆ∗) instead of hN and obtain ωˆ∗b .
4. Repeat steps 1.-3. B times.
5. Calculate the parametric bootstrap estimate of standard error:
sˆeB =

B∑
b=1
[ωˆ∗b − ωˆ∗(.)]2
(B − 1)

1
2
, where ωˆ∗(.) =
∑B
b=1 ωˆ
∗
b
B
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A.4 Model with Learning
In our second approach, we allow for learning. The difference to the deterministic model is
that the growth rate of returns from full patent protection gkt is not constant anymore. We
assume that the patentee can discover a new use or another way how to exploit his invention
and increase his returns. This dynamic approach follows closely the models in Pakes (1986),
Lanjouw (1998), and Deng (2011). In this specification the growth rate gkt may exceed the
minimum growth rate δ < 1. Therefore, we model gkt as the maximum of either the constant
growth rate δ, or an alternative growth rate uk, such that gkt = max(δ, u
k). We assume that
uk is drawn randomly from an exponential distribution:
qk(uk | t) = 1
σkt
exp(−u
k
σkt
) (6)
Since the probability of getting higher returns is supposed to decrease with a patent's matu-
rity, the standard deviation of the random growth rate uk is set to σkt = (φ
k)tσk0 , with φ
k ≤ 1
and t ∈ 1, ..., T .
The parameters φk and σk0 both determine how fast learning vanishes. Since renewal fees in
the early periods are low, they also determine when hazard proportions of expiration start
to exceed the obsolescence rate. Besides, if learning vanishes fast, the cost advantage of the
LOR declaration will gain in importance throughout all years and this will shift the HRL(t)
curve upwards. The parameter δ mainly determines the variation in hazard proportions for
ages when learning has already vanished or when patents get closer to their expiration date.
The variance of the distribution of initial returns, σIR, particularly affects the curvature of
HRXNoLOR(t) and HR
X
LOR(t). Higher values of σIR imply a more skewed distribution of patent
returns which cause higher dropout rates for intermediate ages and lower dropout rates for
higher ages, when renewal fees are highest. Lower values of σIR have the opposite effect.
Together with the probability of not becoming obsolete θ, the parameters that determine the
distribution of initial returns, µIR, σIR, and the parameters that determine the LOR growth
rates, φl, σl0, the model with learning depends on eight structural parameters:
µIR, σIR, θ, φ
l, σl0, φ
k, σk0 , δ
The estimation results are presented in Table 7.
Although the reported mean square error (MSE) is higher compared to the deterministic
model the overall model fit is slightly improved. MSE was calculated without using the
weights we put on the hazard proportions for estimation (matrix A(ω) in the objective
function (3)). Graphically, the hazard proportions of expiration do not differ much between
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Parameter Model with Learning (Stochastic)
β (fixed) 0.950
µIR 8.787
σIR 1.654
θ 0.920
θ1998 0.978
θ2002 0.832
δ 0.976
φk 0.202
σk0 0.948
φl 0.461
σl0 3.399
Age-Cohort Cells 282
Sample Size 211,869
Simulation Size 635,607
MSEAll 0.000973
V arAll(hN ) 0.0055
1−MSEAll/V arAll(hN ) 0.8233
Table 7: Parameter Estimates
both models (see Figures 8-10). However, the stochastic model allows the hazard rates of
declaration to rise more clearly for the years seven to twelve.
Compared to the deterministic model (see Table 3) we receive higher estimates for the param-
eters which determine the distribution of the initial returns, µIR and σIR. The mean initial
value (25,638e) and the median initial value (6,534e) are higher. Furthermore, we confirm
the result from previous patent renewal studies that learning possibilities for patents, defined
as Pr(gkt ≥ δ), disappear after age five (see Table 8). Overall, we obtain value distributions
with higher mean values for the stochastic model (see Table 9). The average value of patent
protection is 300,415e. This is surprising, since in previous patent renewal studies the patent
value estimates from the stochastic models (Pakes 1986; Lanjouw 1998) were lower than the
ones from the deterministic models (Schankerman and Pakes 1986; Schankerman 1998).
A possible explanation for the discrepancy could be found in how we constructed the weight-
ing matrix A(ω) in the objective function (3). Since the hazard proportions of declaration
are at least ten times smaller than the hazard proportions of expiration we have increased
the weight given to the distance between sample and simulated hazard proportions of dec-
laration. Since our focus lies on the license of right system and the value of exclusivity, we
tried to improve the efficiency of estimating the distribution of the parameters associated
with the LOR growth rates. This might have undermined the efficiency of estimating the
parameters that determine the variation in returns from full patent protection, µIR, σIR and
φk, σk0 . Besides, the stochastic model is computationally more costly, since double integrals
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Figure 8: Hazard Proportions of Expiration - Patents Not Endorsed LOR
have to be evaluated numerically. Therefore, it was not possible to run the global optimiza-
tion algorithms, which rely on random search, enough times to ensure that the estimator did
not get stuck in a local optimum. In the deterministic model, in turn, the variation in returns
from full patent protection is completely determined by the parameters of the distribution of
initial returns, µIR and σIR. Furthermore, since we do not have to evaluate double integrals
we have performed enough runs to believe that we have obtained robust results.
Age 2 3 4 5 6 7
Pr(gkt ≥ δ) 26.88% 5.77% 0.21% <0.01% 0.00% 0.00%
Table 8: Learning and Patent Age
Nevertheless, the main results obtained from the deterministic model remain valid. Patents
for which LOR has been declared are on average 21.74% less valuable than patents which
have never been endorsed LOR. Furthermore, on average, 64.42% of the value of patents
for which LOR had been declared was generated after the declaration. Since the estimated
parameters which determine the LOR growth rates, φl and σl0, do not differ much between
both models, we obtain a similar distribution of the value of (non-) exclusivity (see Table 10).
Almost 8% of patents could maintain at least 50% of the returns from full patent protection
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Figure 9: Hazard Proportions of LOR Declaration
if they declared LOR in the first year and only less than 2% if they declared in the twentieth
year. Some patents, 0.63%, could even increase their returns if they gave up exclusivity in
the first year and less than 0.03% if they gave up exclusivity in the last year.
The welfare implications also do not differ. Compared to the deterministic model the fraction
of unambiguously welfare decreasing declarations (Cost-Saving Motive) is somewhat higher
for early declarations and lower for declarations made for older patents (see Table 11). If we
exclude the possibility to declare LOR from the patent system the aggregated private value
of patent rights falls by 0.47% but the patent office's revenues rise by 2.31%. If we make the
LOR declaration compulsory for all patents (Compulsory Licensing) the aggregated private
value of patent rights falls by 80.44%.
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Figure 10: Hazard Proportions of Expiration - Patents Endorsed LOR
at Age 10 at Age 5 at Age 1
Percentile All All No LOR Endorsed LOR
50 0 14,405 56,144 57,569 39,082
75 19,256 87,867 200,108 204,275 131,080
90 113,525 317,003 602,521 610,462 450,369
95 258,759 652,934 1,164,599 1,176,564 952,350
99 1,045,241 2,370,391 3,931,909 3,960,412 3,495,881
99.9 4,563,423 9,798,748 15,373,407 15,396,543 14,666,449
Mean 62,758 160,938 300,415 304,182 238,049
Table 9: Value Distributions for Cohort 1983 in 2002e (Stochastic Model)
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Age Pr(glt ≥ 1) Pr(glt ≥ 0.75) Pr(glt ≥ 0.5)
1 0.63% 2.25% 7.96%
2 0.56% 2.04% 7.48%
3 0.49% 1.86% 7.01%
4 0.43% 1.68% 6.56%
5 0.38% 1.52% 6.14%
6 0.33% 1.37% 5.73%
... ... ... ...
18 0.05% 0.32% 2.16%
19 0.04% 0.28% 1.96%
20 0.03% 0.24% 1.78%
Table 10: Evolution of LOR Growth Rates (Stochastic Model)
Age 1-5 6-10 11-15 16-20 1-20
Cost-Saving Motive 0.31% 4.44% 11.12% 16.57% 4.17%
Commitment Motive 99.69% 95.56 88.88 83.43 95.83%
Table 11: Motive for LOR Declaration (Stochastic Model)
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